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Abstract 
We develop a game theoretic model of 2 candidate competition 
over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have 
incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of 
other participants. The players consist of the voters and the 
candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the 
information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy 
choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and 
candidates alike) observe contemporaneous poll data broken down by 
various subgroups of the population. 
The main results of the paper give conditions on the number 
and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are 
sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) 
extracts all information. 
1. Introduction
We develop a game theoretic model of 2 candidate competition 
over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have 
incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of 
other participants. The players consist of the voters and the 
candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the 
information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy 
choices while uninformed voters do not. All players, voters and 
candidates alike, observe contemporaneous poll data broken down by 
various subgroups of the population. Also, all players have some 
basic knowledge about the structure of the electorate. 
Each participant has beliefs about the parameters he does not 
observe. I.e. uninformed voters have beliefs about the candidate 
strategy choices, and candidates have beliefs about which voters are 
"informed." They then each choose a strategy conditional on their 
beliefs. A voter strategy is a choice of a candidate to vote for, and 
a candidate strategy is a choice of a policy position in the 
multidimensional policy space, 
We define a set of strategies together with a set of beliefs 
to be in equilibrium if it satisfies two conditions: First, all 
participants are maximizing their payoff subj e·ct to their beliefs, 
Second, all participants must have beliefs which are consistent with 
the information they observe. A situation in which the voters are in 
equilibrium, but the candidates are not is referred to as a voter 
equilibrium. An equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) is said to extract 
all information if all players behave as if they have complete 
information. 
The main results of the paper give conditions on the number 
and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are 
sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) 
extracts all information. 
This paper is related to but makes somewhat different 
assumptions than a previous paper of ours {1982] which develops a 
similar model in one dimension. In our previous paper, we assumed 
that voters observed both endorsement information as well as poll 
data. Here the voter only sees poll data, but the poll data must be 
broken down by subgroups in order to provide the voter with enough 
information to draw inferences about candidate positions, Also, our 
previous paper did not require the voters or candidates to have as 
much structural information about the electorate as we require here. 
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Here, we require the voters to have some knowledge of the distribution 
of preferences in each subgroup of the population. An assumption of 
this sort seems to be necessary for the multidimensional extension. 
2. The Formal Deyelopment 
We are given a set, N, of yoters, a set X s;; Jtm of 
alternatives, and for each voter, a s N, a utility fpnction, 
ua:X � JR representing voter a's preferences. We assume that the
population, N, of voters can be partitioned into two subgroups, I and 
U, representing the informed and uninformed voters, respectively, We 
further assume that t subpopulations, N1,N2, • • •  ,Nt of N can be
identified. These can be thought of as ethnic, or other socio-
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economic subdivisions of N. Note that the Ni need not necessarily be
a partition of N, nor need any two Ni necessarily be disjoint. We let
µ be a measure on the measurable subsets, N of N, and, for each i, let 
µi be the probability measure induced on the measurable subsets of N,
conditional on being in Ni. Thus for any C e  N,µi(C)
µ(N. n C)/µ(N.). 
1 1 
In addition to the voters, we assume there are two candidates, 
labeled 1 and 2 , and we let K = {1,2} be the set of candidates, If 
k a K is a candidate, we use the notation k to represent the other 
candidate, i.e., (k} = K - (k} , 
We now define a game, in which the players are the voters, N, 
together with the candidates, K. The strategy � for a voter 
a e N and candidate k e K are denoted Ba and Sk respectively. The
strategy spaces are defined as follows 
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Voter Strategy Space: B4 = K U {0} .
(2.1) 
Candidate Strategy Space: Sk = X.
We let H denote the set of functions from N into KU {0} ,  and 
§ denote the set of functions from K to X, Elements of H are denoted
b, with b(a) & B4 representing the choice of strategy by voter a. 
Elements of § are denoted s, with s(k) e Sk representing the choice of
strategy. Alternatively, we also write ba for b(a) and 't for s(k),
We call ba voter a's ballot, and sk candidate k's� position. 
let n = § x n. and an element w = (s,b) 8 n represents a choice of 
strategies by all players. 
We
Given a choice of strategies, say w = (s,b) by all players, we 
can compute a poll outcome and the outcome function. For each 
1 � i � t, and k s  KU {O} , we define 
and 
Vk(s,b) = {asNlba = k}
vk(s,b) = µ(Vk(s,b))
(2.2) 
(2, 3) 
(2.4) 
So Vk(s,b) represents the set of voters voting for candidate k (or
abstaining if k = 0), vk(s,b) is the total vote for candidate k and
pik(s,b) represents the poll result in group i (i. e. , the proportion
of group i voting for candidate k), For each i, we use the notation 
s 
(2.5) 
and 
(2.6) 
We also write 
(2.7) 
3 2 We let A= {q = (�,q1,q2) s :m I } qi= 1,qi 2. 0 all i} to be thef=o 
unit simplex in :m.3, Clearly, for all (s,b) 8 0, pi(s,b) s A, and
t - ( t p(s,b) s A ,  We let r r1,. . .  ,rt) s :m , with ri > 0 for all i.
(For example, we could define ri = µ(Ni) for each i.) Then for any
p1,p2 e A, we define llp1 - p2llr = �1rilp! - p�I, where
Ip! - p�I = [' lp!k - p�kl. We next define the outcome function bylt=l 
1 if v1(s,b) > v2(s,b)
k(s,b) = 2 if v2(s,b) > v1(s,b)
0 otherwise. 
So k(s,b) represents the winning candidate, given the choice of 
strategies (s,b) by all players. 
(2.9) 
With these definitions, we can now define the � function 
to the game. We write M4(s,b) and �(s,b) for the payoff function for
a voter a s N and a candidate, k s K, and they are defined by; 
for all a s N, 
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(2.10) 
1 if k(&,b) = k 
)\(s,b) = -1 if k(s,b) = k 
0 otherwise 
(2.11) 
In addition to the above more or less standard structure, we 
assume that each actor has beliefs about certain parameter& of the 
game. The belief space for voter a is denoted Sa, and that for
candidate k is denoted ck. We assume the belief spaces are given by:
-a '.::2 Voter Belief Space: S = x-
(2.12) 
Candidate Belief Space: ck= 1::f
-Here i2 is the set of probability measures over x2 = XX X. We let !
denote the set of functions from N into i2 and � the set of functions 
from K into l::f. - - -a Elements of ! are denoted s, with & being used to
represent s(a), for a e N. Similarly, elements of� are denoted C, 
with ck representing C(k), for k s  N. -a '.::2 k So s s x-, and C e li· We can
-a think of & as being a probability measure representing voter a's
belief of the probable location of the candidate positions, 
-a We use the notation supp(s ) to represent the support
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set of the measure ;a. On the other hand, ck represents candidate k's
belief about the subset ck� N of voters who are "oonoerned" - i. e.• 
who know the candidate positions. We let A = � X !· 
Before we define the notion of equilibrium used here, we 
develop some further notation. For any s s i• and k a K, we write 
and (2.1 3) 
A 
So Vk(s) is the set of voters who prefer the policy position of
A 
candidate k over that of k, while V0(s) is the set of voters who are
indifferent between the two candidates. 
Next, given any measurable C s;; N, we define, 
for all k s  KU {O}, 
A 
k if a e Vk(s) and if a e CA 
ba(sfC) = O if a I c 
and 
A A A A 
We write pi(sfC) = (pi0<slC), pi1 <slC),pi2<slC)), and
(2. 14) 
(2.15) 
A A A A 
p(slC) = (p1(slC), • • •  ,pt(sfC)). Given any set Cs;; N, ba(sfC) is the
ballot that would result if all voters in C voted correctly, and all 
those in N - C abstained. We call the set C the set of concerned 
,., 
voters. So, pi(slc) is the predicted poll in group i when the voters
A 
behave according to b(slC). 
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Now, for any s,s• a !  we define an equivalence relation: on ! 
as follows: 
A A 
s - s' <=> Vk(s) = Vk(s') for all k s  KU (O} . (2,16) 
For any subset A� l!, we write A: s' <=> s : s' for all s s A. We 
0 let l! !;:; !  be a subspace of ! which contains exactly one
representative of each equivalence class. 
SO( )- p 
A 0 
ll p - p(s fN>ll r
And finally, for any 
. 
(2.17) 
So l!O(-p) is the set of so a ! which give the best fit of the actual to
the predicted poll based on s0•
Definition 2.1: An equilibrium is a pair (w,�), where w = (s,b) a R 
and�= (C,s) a A satisfy 
voters: For all a s N, 
-a where the expectation is with respect to 8 , 
V2: a a I=> supp(;a) = (s} ,
Candidates: For all k e K, 
C2: ck e arg
,., 
min clfp(s,b) - p(slc>llrJ C�N 
The equilibrium conditions require that all players maximize 
their expected payoff subject to their beliefs (Conditions Vl and Cl), 
Further, the beliefs which the players hold must be as consistent as 
possible with the information they observe (Conditions V2 and C2). We 
also define a "partial equilbrium," or "voter equilibrium," in which 
the voters are in equilibrium, but the candidates are not. This type 
of equilibrium is useful in describing what might occur if there are 
exogenous constraints on candidate positions. 
Definition l·l A yoter equilibrium, conditional on s e !, is a pair 
(b,;), where be!! and ; a S satisfy 
9 
10 
-Qwhere the expectation is with respect to s • 
{s} 
Q B U => supp(;Q) - sQ for some sQ B �(p(s,b))
3. Interpretation 
The formulation of the previous section makes certain implicit 
assumptions about what information each participant observes, and 
about what each participant knows about the underlying structure of 
the game. We discuss these assumptions in more detail before 
proceeding. 
The Information Assumptions 
Our definition of equilibrium assumes that each participant 
observes certain contemporaneous data on the strategy choices of other 
participants. Candidates and informed voters observe the candidate 
positions, s, as well as the poll results, p(s,b), However, 
uninformed voters do not observe candidate positions. They only 
observe poll results. 
In addition to this contemporaneous information about player 
strategies which they directly observe, all actors are assumed to have 
some basic knowledge about the preferences and likely behavior of 
other participants. This underlying structural information is 
A 
captured in their knowledge of the function p(s lC), which is a 
reconstruction of the likely voting behavior that will result when the 
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candidate positions are given by s, and the set of concerned voters is 
A 
c. Note, however, that the voters need only know p(s lN), while the
A 
candidates have the more particularistic knowledge of p(s lC) for any 
measurable C B N. 
The information which is assumed of each participant is 
summarized in the following table, For the case when preferences are 
in the class of "intermediate preferences," we show later that the 
A 
structural information which is generated by p is equivalent to the 
players having certain knowledge about the distribution of voter 
characteristics in each group Ni' This equivalent structural
information is given in the last column of the table (the measure µ� 
will be defined later). 
Contemporaneous 
Information 
Candidates s,p(s,b) 
Informed Voters• s,p(s,b) 
Uninformed Voters p(s,b) 
Structural 
Information 
A 
p( • 1 · ) 
A 
p( ' IN> 
A 
p( · IN> 
Equivalent Structural 
Information for 
Intermediate Preferences 
c µi,µi' 1 � i � tC s N
µi,1 � i � t
µi,1 � i � t
•Actually the only information which is required of the informed
voters by the equilibrium definition is s. Since it does not make 
sense to assume that they have less information available to them than
the uninformed voters, Jlle assume that informed voters also have 
information on p(s,b), p(s lN), and µi, but chose to ignore it becauseof the precedence of s. 
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Equilibrium Conditions 
;a of s, This is exactly statement (Vl) of Definition 2.1. 
We next justify each of the four Equilibrium conditions. We Note that by assuming (3.2) directly instead of (3. 1), we 
consider first the voters, then the candidates. 
For a standard Bayesian equilibrium, each voter would try to 
maximize his expected payoff, given his beliefs about the strategies 
of the other players. Thus, applying (2.10), voter a e N should solve 
(3. 1) 
where the expectation is taken with respect to a's belief of (s,b). 
However, since the ballot aggregation procedure (i. e. , majority rule) 
is positively responsive, given any beliefs ;a of the candidate 
positions, voter a has a dominant strategy regardless of the value of 
b. Namely, voting for the candidate with the highest expected utility
can never hurt that candidate and might sometimes help. In this 
analysis, we assume that voters adopt this dominant strategy. Thus, 
we can dispense with voter beliefs about b, and assume that voter a 
will choose b to 
a 
where the expectation is now with respect to the voter' a belief 
(3,2) 
avoid one difficulty for the infinite voter case: If N is infinite, 
no one voter has any impact on the outcome, 10 .l,!ll: strategy is equally 
good if we assume (3.1). By assuming (3.2) instead, we insure that 
even in the infinite voter case, voters will vote for the candidate 
whose policy position gives them the highest utility. 
Our definition of equilibrium requires not only that voters 
maximize expected utility (Vl) with respect to their beliefs, but also 
that their beliefs be consistent with the information they observe 
(V2). Here, we must differentiate between the informed and uninformed 
voters. 
Informed voters 
Informed voters have perfect information, I. e. , given s B � 
and a e I, for ;a to be in equilibrium, V2 must hold: 
-a supp(s ) {s} . (3. 3) 
So an informed voter's beliefs of candidate positions must coincide 
with what the candidates actually decide to do. 
Uninformed voters 
An uninformed voter also has a belief, ;a of s. 
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However, the uninformed voter does not observe the candidate 
positions, rather he only observes aggregate data, namely the poll 
data p(s,b). Requirement (Vl) for the uninformed voter as U states 
that 
(3.4) 
where 
arg min 
SOB�o 
,. 0 1 1  p(s,b> - p(s IN> I I (3.5) 
Thus the uninformed voter uses the poll data to inform his belief, �a. 
of candidate positions in such a way as to make his predicted poll 
outcome correspond as closely as possible with the observed poll 
outcomes. According to (3.4) and (3.5), the uninformed voter uses his 
structural information of the rest of the electorate to infer that the 
poll result which will occur given a choice s s � of candidate 
,. 
strategies is p(slN). I. e. , he assumes that all other voters who are
voting are perfectly informed and vote rationally,' Using (2.15), we 
can write, for ks KU {O} , 1 � i � t, 
(3.6) 
There are several things to note about the above expressions 
for (Vl). First, note that the form of the objective function is 
consistent with the view that each voter believes that as few other 
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voters are making errors as possible, Second, in light of (3,6), the 
structural information necessary for the uninformed voter to be able 
to solve (3.5), is simply that he know µi for 1 � i � t. Next, note
that the model used by the uninformed voter for predicting poll 
outcomes is quite simple. Namely, given any candidate poaitions 
s' a �. the voter assumes that the aupporting coalitions for 
candidates k and k s K are described by the sets of voters who, under 
full information, would prefer sk' or 'i'• respectively.
Candidates 
The candidates will choose policy positions to maximize their 
expectation of winning the election, subject to the beliefs they have 
about the voter utility functions, and hence about the voting behavior 
of the electorate. These beliefs, summarized by their belief, ck, of
the "concerned electorate," must be consistent with the information 
they have about p(s,b), Now for a standard Bayesian equilibrium, 
candidate k s K should choose sk s X to solve
max E [Mk ( s, b)] sksX 
where the expectation is taken over bis belief of b and of sk for 
(3.7) 
k a K - {k} .  However, here we assume that candidate k knows 'i• and 
we require that for any s s �. and belief ck t: N, candidate k assumes
,. k that b is generated according to b(slC ), It follows that � can be
k written as a function only of 'k ' 'k and C • 
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4. Results: Voter Equilibria 
We now consider the existence and properties of equilibria in 
the model developed in the previous two sections. Specifically, we 
are concerned with conditions under which the equilibrium to the model 
corresponds to the behavior which would occur under full information. 
In this situation, we will say that the equilibrium extracts all 
available information, We consider first only voter equilibria, given 
fixed positions of the candidates: 
-Definition 4.1 A voter equilibrium (b,s) s » X S, conditional on s B §
is said to extract all ayailable information iff, for all 
a s N, k B K, 
(4.1) 
Thus, a voter equilibrium extracts all available information 
iff all voters, informed and uninformed alike, vote for the candidate 
they would prefer if they had full information, 
We start with a couple of simple Lemmas characterizing 
individual voting behavior in any voter equilibrium (independent of 
whether it extracts information). 
• • Given fixed candidate strategies s a §, with sk F
- . 
(b,s) s » X § is a voter equilibrium, conditional on s , and 
p• = p(s•,b), Then for la K, 
• s_, if
k 
a) for all a s I
A. • a B Vk(s ) = > ba = k 
b) for all a s U, 3 ,a e iO(p •) auch that
A a a e Vk(s ) = > ba = k.
Proof For all voters, we have, from (Vl) that 
where the expectation is with respect to ;a, But by (Vl) , for 
-a • a e I, supp (s ) = {s } ,  Hence, we must have
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(4.2) 
(4. 3) 
A • • • So, a s  V�(s ) => ua(s�) > u (s ) => b = k, which proves part (a).... ... a k a 
For a s U, on the other hand, we have that supp(;a) : ,a for some
a 0 • s 8 § (p ) • But then, for all s s supp (;a), we have s: sa, or
arg max E [ua('b )] = arg max b eB a b eB a a a a
(4. 4) 
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Q,E. D. 
So, in short, in equilibrium, the informed voters will always 
vote correctly, while the uninformed voters will each vote according 
to an idiosyncratic, normalized, nonstochastic representative of their 
private beliefs. Each of these idiosyncratic private beliefs, of 
course, must be as consistent as possible with the observed poll. 
0 • . When � (p ) is single valued, then it follows that all uninformed 
voters will vote according to the� (although possibly incorrect) 
belief sa of s •.
Next, for any measureable E � N, we define the conditional 
probability measure µ� by 
µ(N. n En C) 
µ(Ni 0 E)
(4.5) 
I U _ Setting ti= µi(I) and ti - µi(U), it follows that (since I and U
partition N) for all 1 � i � t 
(4.6) 
I U where ti + ti = 1. (In other words, for all measureable C � X ,  µi(C)
I I U U 0 = tiµi(C) + tiµi(C). For any s s !, 1 � i � t, and t s  I , we define
(4,7) 
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AE AE '°'E AE '°'E As usual, we write qi(s) = (qi0(s), qi1(s), qi2(1)),and q (1)
"E "E A "N A "N( ) = (q1(s),. , ,,qt(s)).We also write qit(a) = qit(s),qi(s) s qi s and
�(s) = �(s) (4.8) 
Clearly, with the above notation, we have 
,. ,. 
q(s) = p(s fN) (4.9) 
Given any fixed candidate position s• s !• we can define a
correspondence, T:At -7-> At by setting
t 0 ' I"I • T(p) = Co{p' s A I for some sa e ! (p), Pi= tiqi(a )
+ t�(sa) for all 1 � i � t).
So T(p) is the set of polls that could result if all voters vote 
-
optimally according to their beliefs, generated by s, and their 
beliefs are consistent with the information p. (see Lemma 4.1). 
(4.10) 
• • • Lemma !.i Given fixed candidate strategies s e !, with st ; a_, ift 
- . 
(b,s) s � X ! is a voter equilibrium, conditional on s , and 
• • • • p = p(s ,b), then we must have p = T(p ),
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Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 4.1 together with tho 
definition (4.10). 
Q.E.D. 
I. e. , for any equilibrium (b,;), p = p(s•,b) must be a fixed point for
the oorrespondenoe, T. The oorrespondenoe T, oan also be thought of 
as a dynamio desoribing the oonvergenoe of the model to equilbrium. 
This will be elaborated on later. 
Next, we define a notion of oonsistenoy of poll outoomes: 
Definition 4,2 A poll pa At is said to be oon1i1tent .f2I: � S:: N if 3 
s s S suoh that 
"C p = q (s) (4.11) 
If p is oonsistent for N, we say it is oonsistent. 
Thus, the poll is oonsistent for C if the poll results 
restrioted to C oould have been generated by some pair of oandidate 
positions with all voters in C voting as if they had oomplete 
information. For all of our results, we need an assumption on 
oonsistent polls whioh requires that eaoh oonsistent poll be generated 
0 
by a unique s a ! .
Assumption 4.1 If p e At is oonsistent for C, where C is either N, I,
or U, and s, s• a� satisfy p = �(s) = �(s'), then s: s', 
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Our next Lemma proves tho existonoe of equilibria that oxtraot 
all information and shows that if tho poll resulting from a voter 
equilibrium is oonsistont, then tho equilibrium must oxtraot all 
available information, Thus, tho only equilibria of the model ooour 
either when all voters vote oorreotly or when the resulting poll is 
inoonsistent. 
• • • Lemma !.! Given fixed oandidate strategies a a !, with •t F 'i•
there exists a voter equilibrium that extraots all information. 
Further, under Assumption 4.1, any voter equilibrium (b,;) based on s•
for whioh p(b,1•) is oonsistent extraots all information.
Proof: For existenoe, define (b,;) by, for a a N, k a XU (O} , 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
. ... . ... . From (2.4), pik(s , b) = µi(Vk(s )) = qik(s), so p(s ,b) is oonsistent.
... . . 
But then from (4.9), it follows that pi(s IN) = pi(s ,b) for all i.
So piok s0 a !O with 0 • s : & • Henoe (V2) is
satisfied for all a a N (sinoe it is satisfied trivally for a a I,) 10 
(b.' s) is a voter equilibrium. Clearly, by ( 4 .12), (b, 1) extracts all
information. 
- . Now let (b,a) be a voter equilibrium based on a , and write 
• 3 0 ... p = p(s ,b), Then if p is oonsistent, 1' a 1 with p = q(s'). So 
clearly s' a .S.O(p), Further, by assumption 4.1, it follows that any
other element of .S.O(p) must have s: s'. 
0 Hence .S. (p) i1 single
valued, and we let s' a .S.O(p). 
A 
Then we have p = q(s'), Further by
Lemma 4.2, we must have p s T(p), But since .s,O(p) is single valued, 
this means that 
• JAi • &'tJ pi pi(s ,b) = tiqi(s ) + tiqi(s')
JAi • JAi = [tiqi(s ) - tiqi(s')]
+ [t�q�(s') + t�(s')]
22 
I AJ • AJ A ti[qi(s ) - qi(s')] + qi(s') (4.14) 
A 
But, since p is consistent, it follows that p = q(s'), or 
• A equivalently, for all 1 � i � t, that pi= pi(s ,b) = qi(s').
Therefore, equation (4.14) implies that for all 1 � i � t, 
I • I • qi(s ) = qi(s'), Now, by Assumption 4,1, we have s : s', so
A • A Vk(s ) = Vk(s') for all k e KU (0). Hence, for a e U, we have ba = k
A • if a e Vk(s ), and the result is proven,
The above lemma does not rule out the possibility of 
Q,E.D. 
equilibria which do not extract all information, since it is quite 
possible for inconsistent polls to be in equilibrium. le introduce a 
further assumption on the distribution of the voters. 
Assumption 4.2 (Identical Distributions) For all s e .s,, 
AJ AU A q (s) � q (1) = q(s) 
23 
We prove that under Assumption Al, if there are more informed 
than uninformed voters, there is always an equilibrium. 
Theorem 1 If Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 are met and pi(U) < 1/2 for all
i, then for any fixed candidate strategies .• s .S. with sk � si" then
if (b,;) is a voter equilibrium, it extracts all information. 
�: Let (b,;) be a voter equilibrium, with corresponding poll 
-
Since (b,s) is an equilibrium we must have 
pa T(p). So we can write, for 1 � i � t 
• 
for some w1,• • •  ,w •a Jil
t with f wj = 1 and ,J a .s,0(p), We lett /;;1 
I 
A • Then, if Ip - q(s >II � O, we getr 
�
1
ritYl c�wj(�i(sj) - pi)] + (pi - �i(s.>>I
i �
1
rit�Ct1wjl�i(sj) - Pil + lpi - �i(s.)11
[t
l
wj�lrit�l�i(sj) - pill + [�lrit�lpi - �i(s.)11
i [f wjt
• .f ril
�
i(s
j) - Pill+ [t
• f" rilpi -
�
i(s.)11f.;1 b1 /:=1 
t
1
wjt.ll�<s
j) - pllJtl-[t•llp - �(s.>lll
* f A • •11 A • 11 i [t 
Fl
wjllq(s ) pill + [t p - q(s ) 1
• A • A • = 2t llP - qCs >II < llp - q(s >II 
A • Hence, any fixed point p to T(p) must have lip - q(s >II = 0, or
A • p = q(s ). But, then p is consistent, so it follows from Lemma 4. 3
that the voter equilibrium (b,s) extracts all information. 
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Q.E.D. 
S. Examples 
We consider now a general class of preferences to which the 
above development applies, namely the class of so called "intermediate 
preferences, " See e.g., Grandmont [ and Kramer [ ]. Let K be a 
positive integer and let fo: x -> :m and f = (fl" .. ' fL) x -> Jl
L be
continuous functions on X. Then for any p = <P1'""PL) s :m
L, define
vll: x -> lR by vp = f0 + P'f. I, e., for any x 8 x. 
f0(x) + P'f(x) (5.1) 
Then the class of intermediate preferences based on f0,f, written 
U(f0,f) is defined as 
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(S.2) 
It is easily verified that many standard classes of preferences are 
representable as classes of intermediate preferences. For example, 
the space of Cobb Douglas utility functions is generated by setting 
f0(x) • 0 and fi(x) = ln xi. The space of Euclidian, or type I,
1 preferences is generated by setting L = m, f0(x) = - 2 x'x, and
fi(x) = xi. The space of quadratic utility functions where each voter
has an idiosyncratic salience matrix and ideal point is generated by 
setting L = (m + l)m, f0(x) • 0, fi(x) = xi for 1 i i � m, 
and f j (x) = x.xj for 1 i i � m, 1 i j i m.m +i 1 
For our purposes, we need to identify voters not only by their 
utility functions, but also by their information class and voter type. 
So we let N = {0,l} t+l X :mL, where L is a positive integer. So each
voter a s N is described by a vector of attributes a= (r,p), where 
r s {0,l} t· + .. 1 and p s :m K. The vector r = <r0.r1 ..... rt) describes
the voter type (i.e., his information class and the subgroups to which 
he belongs). We define I= {a= <r.P) s Nlr0 = 1), U = {a s Nlr0 = OJ 
and Ni = {a s Nly i = 1} . The vector P <P1'" .,pL) gives 
parameters of the voter utility function. We let f0: x -> 
f : X -> lR L be defined as above. Then for each a= <r.P>
assume ua = v13 = fo + P'f. I.e., for all x s X,
the 
ll and 
11 N, we 
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(5. 3) 
Clearly, u0 e U(f0,f) for all a s N. 
Now, for any s s S, we have that, for k s I,
= {a s Nlu0(sk) > u0(s_)} = {a e Nlf0(sk) + P'f(sk) k 
> f0(s_) + P'f(s_)} 
k k 
where 
A 
= Ca e NIP'(f(sk) - f(s_)) > f0Cs_) - f0(sk)}k k 
(a B NIP'hk(s) > ck(s)} (5.4) 
(5.5) 
So Vk(s) is simply the set of voters in N who's parameters p lie in a
half space in llL defined by the vector hk(s) and ck(s), A poll
p e At is consistent for E i:; N iff 3 s s .§ such that for all
1 Si St and k s  KU (0} ,  
Now, for Assumption 4,1 to be met, for any s,s' s .§with 
AE Ap, q (s) = q '(s'), we must have s: s'. Thus, we must have
(5,6) 
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for all k s  KU {O} ,  E e  {I,U,N} , I.e. , we must have, for all 
a,s' s S, k s  KU {O} ,  E e  (I,U,N}, 
(5,8) 
We conjecture that a sufficient condition for (5.8) to be 
generically satisfied (with respect to an appropriate topology on the 
set of possible measures µ on N) is that t 2 L + 1. I. e. there must 
be more sources of information than there are free parameters in the 
class of utility functions. The intuition behind this conjecture is 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for the case when L = 2. Here the 
marginal density functions of the µ� over the parameter space are 
assumed to be continuous density functions with support equal to 1t2•
The figures give contours of the marginal density functions for the 
µ� over the parameter space, it2• If t = L, then we note that any
consistent poll can be generated by two different voting coalitions. 
However, if another group is added, as in figure 3, then as long as 
the density function for the third group is not "colinear" with that 
of the first two, then the additional information provided by the poll 
in the third group identifies the correct voting coalition, so that 
Assumption 1 is satisfied. A similar argument seems to hold for 
larger dimensions as well, With an appropriate topology on the set µ 
of allowable measures on N, any measure will be arbitrarily close to 
one for which µ� is continuous with support equal to It L, and for
which the µ� are not "oolinear,H The above arg11111ent ii obviously very 
heuristic, and we leave it for future research to study the validity 
FIGURE 1 
Two consistent candidate 
positions for the poll 
p= ( (0,. 8,. 2), (0,. 3,.7)) 
FIGURE 2 
With three groups, candidate 
strategy pair s' is no longer consistent 
for the poll p= ( (0,,8,.2), (0,.3,.7), (0,,01,. 99)) 
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V (s I)0 
of this conjecture in more detail. In any case it should be clear 
that with t sufficiently large, and the p� continuous with support 
equal to EL and sufficiently dispersed, Assumption 1 will be met.
To illustrate some of the ideas which have been developed 
above, we present an example. We let X = 1t2, and assume preferences 
are Euclidian. 
So for all«= (y,p) a N, u4 a U(f0,f), where f0(x) 
and f(x) = x, So u4(x) = P'x - ix•x = (p - �)'x for some P 
1 = - zx'x
8 JR2.
(The parameter p represents n's ideal point), Using (S.4) and (S,S), 
we can write 
where 
So 
s_) 
k 
(S.9) 
(S.10) 
(5.11) 
,. 
Hence Vk(s) consists of exactly those voters whose parameter P (which
corresponds to the voter's ideal point) is closer to sk than to s_.k 
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We assume there are 3 subpopulations, N1,Ni, and N3, which
partition N, We assume that µ(Ni) 
� µ(N)/3 for all i, and for E = I
or E = U, we assume that, for any borel set C t;,X, 
µ�({a= (y, p )  s N i p  s 
where 
I J:1 = 
I 
J:2 = 
I J: = 3 
(-2.0, -1.0) 
(2.0, 1.0) 
(1.0, -2.0) 
J 1 -1/2(:.: - x�)'(x - x�) C}) � 1 1 d• C c _e A \12n 
u 
J: = 1 
u J: = 2 
u J: = 3 
(-2.0, 0,0) 
(2.0, 2.0) 
(3.0, 2.0) 
(S.12) 
(S.13) 
We assume that for each i, µ. (U) = µ.(I) = 1/2, 10 that for each i, 
1 1 
(S.14) 
• Now, we assume that the candidates adopt the positions s = ( , ), and 
-
we consider the initial voter strategy (b,s) which is defined as 
follows: For a a I, voters vote correctly. I .• e. , 
or equivalently, p a 
,. . a B Vk(s ) = >  ba = k
• 
Gk(s ) = >  ba = k, whereas for a a U,
a a N1 = > ba = 2 
a s N2 = > ba = 1
a s N3 = > ba = 1 
(S.15) 
(S.16) 
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(Thus, the uninformed voters vote in such a way as to create a worst 
case�i. e. the uninformed voters vote contrary to how they would tend 
to vote under full information). The resulting poll, p', ia aiven in 
Table 1. 
t "' We now consider a sequence of polls (p }t�l generated by
choosing pt+l a T(pt) for each t 2 1. This is the sequence of polls
which would result if voters, in period t, adjusted their beliefs to 
be consistent with pt (say to st a !O(pt)), and then vote optimally
according to this belief. I. e., for a a I, in period t, 
(S.17) 
and for a a U, in period t, 
,. t-1 t a a Vk(s ) = >  ba = k (S.18) 
Equivalently, in light of (S.9)-(S.11), we can write, for 
• 
a a I, p a Gk(s ) = >,ba = k, whereas for
a e U, p a Gk(s
t-l) = >  ba = k. So for all i,
(S.19) 
(Compare to equation (4.10)) • 
best 
"U t-1 "I • t Table 1 gives, for each period, q (s ), q Cs ), p ,  and the
t ,. t fitting poll to p ,  namely q(s ), Figure 1 graphs the best
fitting hyperplanes G(st) for 1 i t i 8, We see that for this
t ,. • t • example, that the p converge to q(s ) and that s(p ) converges to s • 
31 
Period Group 
t i 
1 
1 2 
3 
1 
2 2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
4 2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
6 2 
3 
1 
7 2 
3 
1 
8 2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
"U t-1 qik(s(p )) 
candidate 
k 
1 2 
.ooo 1.000 
1.000 .ooo 
1.000 .ooo 
,366 ,634 
,503 .497 
,980 ,020 
,549 .451 
.237 ,763 
.950 .oso 
,666 ,334 
,063 .937 
.644 ,356 
,887 ,113 
,094 ,906 
.403 ,597 
,921 ,079 
.118 ,882 
.245 ,755 
.929 ,071 
.136 ,864 
,171 .829 
,931 .069 
,151 ,849 
.137 ,863 
.936 ,064 
,174 ,826 
,121 ,879 
AI • qu<• > t pilr. 
oandida te oandida te 
k k 
1 2 1 2 
.944 .056 .472 .528 
,196 .804 .598 ,402 
,500 ,500 .750 ,250 
,944 ,056 ,655 ,345 
,196 ,804 .349 ,651 
,500 .500 .740 .260 
.944 ,056 .746 ,254 
.196 ,804 ,216 .784 
.soo .soo .125 ,275 
.944 .056 .sos .195 
.196 .804 .129 ,871 
.soo ,500 .572 .428 
,944 .056 ,916 ,084 
,196 ,804 .145 ,855 
,500 ,500 ,451 .549 
.944 ,056 ,933 .067 
.196 ,804 ,157 ,843 
,500 .soo ,373 .627 
.944 ,056 ,937 .063 
.196 ,804 ,166 ,834 
,500 ,500 ,336 ,664 
.944 ,056 ,938 ,062 
.196 .804 .173 .827 
.500 ,500 .318 ,682 
.944 .056 .940 ,060 
.196 ,804 .185 ,815 
,500 .soo ,311 ,689 
� 
Convergence of p t to q(s*), 
... t qu<•<P » 
candidate 
k 
1 2 
,468 .532 
,601 ,399 
.961 .039 
.657 .343 
.346 ,654 
.941 .059 
.750 ,250 
.103 ,897 
.720 ,28U 
,913 .087 
,130 ,870 
.578 .422 
.93 5 ,065 
,145 ,855 
.453 .547 
,938 .062 
,156 ,844 
.376 ,624 
.938 ,062 
,166 ,834 
,332 .668 
.938 ,062 
.172 ,828 
,321 .679 
.940 ,060 
,185 ,815 
.311 ,689 
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lip t -
�<•<Pt» 11 
.4352 
.4128 
.2414 
.2284 
.0430 
,018U 
,0088 
,0096 
.oooo 
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xi2 
a4 
/ 
2 3 xil 
-·---- --� 
I -1 exl 
-2 
/ 
-3 
Figure 1 
Convergence of a(s(pt)) to a(s*), 
*Here we use the notation at = a(s(pt)), 
t is on The half space a2(s(p )) 
the side of at indicated by the arrows. Also a* = a(s*), 
This particular example suggests that the theorems of this 
paper can probably be strengthened. Here we note that the dynamic 
t+l t process described by p a T(p ) converges to a voter equilibrium
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which extracts all available information even though the distributions 
of the uninformed and informed voters within each subgroup are 
different, 
6. Results: Full Equilibrium 
This section investigates the properties of full equilibria to 
the model of section 2, i.e., of equilibria ((s,b),(C,;)) satisfying 
Definition 2.1. For a full equilibrium, then, both candidates and 
voters need to be in equilibrium. Again, we are concerned with 
conditions under which such equilibria correspond to what would happen 
under the case of full information. 
Definition f.! The strategy pair s a ! is a full information 
candidate equilibrium if, whenever ks X and s' a! satisfy sk = 51'•
,. ,. 
l\_(s',b(s'IN)) i Mk(s,bCslN)) (6.1) 
Note that equivalently, because of the symmetry of the game, 
we can write the equation of Definition 6.1 as 
(6.2) 
or 
(6.3) 
for all k e X, a' BS with sk • 'i
'•
Throughout this section, we also make another aaaumption. 
,.
Assumption f.! For all s B S with s1 � s2, p(V0Cs)) = O.
t 
� f.! We assume UN = N and that Assumption 6.1 holds. If, for 
i"'l i
• • • • 
all s a ! with sk F 'i• any voter equilibrium based on s extracts
all information, then if ((s,b), (C,;)) is an equilibrium, then either 
s is a full information candidate equilibrium or sk = 'i•
�Suppose ((s,b), (C,;)) is an equilibrium with sk F •i• Then,
for the voters to satisfy (Vl) and (V2) of the equilbrium definition, 
-
(b,s) must be a voter equilibrium with respect to s. But then, by
assumption, (b,;) extracts all information, so p(s,b) a �Cs). But 
now, since candidate beliefs satisfy C2, 
ck e arg
= arg 
"' 
min cllp(s,b) - p(slc>ll ] 
Cs;; N r 
"' ,. 
min cllq(s) - p(slc>ll ]
Cs;; N r 
Now for all 1 i i i t, kB XU {O), 
and 
(6.4) 
(6.5) 
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for k s K 
for k = 0 
A A 
then pik(slC) = qik(s), 
A A 
or q(s) = p(slC),
(6.6) 
So clearly, if C = N, 
Hence, any ck solving 
A 
(6.4) must satisfy q(s) 
A k = p(slc ), This means,
A A k in particular, that qi0(s) = pi0(slC ), or
A 
But, by Assumption 6,1, µ(V0(s)) = 0 for all s, so
Also µi(N - C
k) =µ(Ni - c
1). So the above implies
all i. It follows that 
or, 
0 = .(- µ(N - Ck) 2. µ( � (N. - ck))b1 i i=l 1 
t k k = µ(( UN ) - C ) = µ(N - C ) 
i=l i 
µ(N) 
(6.7) 
A 
µi(V0(s)) = o. 
µ(Ni - C
k) = 0 for
(6 ,8) 
(6.9) 
Now assume that s is not a full information candidate 
equilibrium, Then there is a k e K and an s' a S with s'i = sk such 
that 
A A �(s',b(s'IN)) > M1(s,b(slN)) (6. 10) 
But now, using the fact that µ(Ck) = µ(N), it is easy to show that
A A k 
�(s',b(s'IN)) = M1(s',b(s•lc )) for all s'. Hence, we have
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(6,11) 
It follows that s does not satisfy (Cl) of the equilibrium definition, 
hence is not an equilibrium, 
Q,E.D. 
Unfortunately, the above Lemma leaves open the possibility that we 
could have equilibria where both candidates adopt the same policy 
positions, but where these policy positions are not at a full 
information candidate equilibrium. In this case, of course, the 
informed voters would abstain, but the uninformed voters might still 
believe there is information in the polls, and vote in a way such that 
they cue off of the information provided to the pollster by other 
uninformed voters. 
Any belief by the candidates about who the concerned voters 
are would be consistent with observed data, So if the candidates were 
both positioned at a full information equilibrium of the voters who 
they believed to be concerned voters, then this could be an 
equilibrium as defined in Definition 2.1. However, equilibria of this 
sort are quite unstable, because if either candidate makes a slight 
miscalculation or an error in his choice of strategy, then the beliefs 
of both candidates will be inconsistent with the poll data which 
results from all voters adopting equilibrium strategies, To banish 
the above type of equilibria, we introduce a somewhat atronaer notion 
of equilibrium, This stronger version requires that candidate beliefs 
must be consistent not only with the information that is generated 
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when the candidates adopt their equilibrium strategies, but also with 
the information that is generated when they make small errors. 
Definition An equilibrium ((s,b),(C,;)) is said to be informationally 
stable if there is a neighborhood N(s) of s such that whenever 
. . -· . s s N(s), and (b ,s ) is a voter equilibrium based on s ,  then the 
candidate beliefs C are consistent with the data p(s•,b•),
Theorem f.! Under the conditions of Lemma 6.1, if there is a full 
information candidate equilibrium, there exists an informationally 
stable equilibrium, Further if ((s,b),(C,;)) is an informationally 
stable equilibrium, 1 is a full information candidate equilibrium. 
P�oof To prove existence, we assume s• is a full information
• • • candidate equilibrium with s1 = s2• By symmetry it follows such an s 
• exists. Then we define ((s,b), (C,s)) by setting s= s ,C = (N,N),
snd for all a s  N, set ba = 0, and supp(;a) = {1} ,
To show this is an equilibrium, we verify each condition in turn. 
Vl: Since supp(;a) = {sa} for all a a N, it follows that we need
Cl: 
only find b a B to max[u (s
• )] ,  But ua(s1
*>a a a b 
• 
Hence 0 Barg max [ua(sb )] ,b sB a 
• 
a a 
a 
Since s is a full information candidate equilibrium with 
• • 'k = sk, it follows that for all s e S with 'i = ai• that
,. . ,. . 
Mk(a,b(slN)) .{ Mk(s ,b(s IN))
Since ck = N, it follows that
V2: For all 1 � i � t, 
A A A A 
pi(s,b) = (1,0,0) = (µ(V0(s)),µ
(V1(s)),µ(V2(s))) = p(slN)
A 
hence llp(s,b) - p(slN> llr = O. So, 
aupp(;a) = {s} solves V2
C2: As above, for ck = N,
so ck= N solves C2, 
Now to show that the equilibrium is informationally stable, we let 
• N(s) be a neighborhood of s = s ,  and pick s' s N(s) with sk' r si'•
By assumption, we know that the resulting voter equilibrium (b', a)
extracts all information. Hence, for all a a N, k a K U  {O} , 
Hence llp(s',b') - ;(s'IN>llr = o, 10 for ck= N, conditions C2 is
met. So c
k= N is consistent with the data p(s'b'), and it follows
that the equilibrium is informationlly stable. This proves the first
39 
assertion in the theorem, 
-
Now assume that ((a, b), (C, s)) is an informationally stable 
equilibrium. From the previous lemma, we know that either the 
conclusion is true, or s1 = 12• So assume 11 = s2• Let N(s) be a
neighborhood of s, and pick s' s N(s) with 11• � 12•. Then by
assumption, if (b',s') is a voter equilibrium based on s', it extracts 
A all information, So a s Vk(s') = > b0' = k
A 6.1, p(V0(s')) = o. Further, by assumption Then, using an argument
similar to that in Lemma 6.1, we have p(N - ck)= 0, or p(Ck) = p(N),
But now, if ((s,b),(C,;)) is an informationally stable equilibrium, it 
must be an equilibrium, Thus, by Cl, 
for all s' with 'k' = 'i" But since p(Ck) = p(N), it follows that for
A k A I all s, l\;(s,bCslc )) = Mk(s,b(s N)), Hence
whenever k e I and s' s §. satisfies •t' = •t• But this implies that s 
is a full information candidate equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
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